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The development of labour laws in South Africa has registered major strides in 
regulating the employment relations.  These developments have been in tandem 
with the political and socio-economic development of South African society.  
Amongst the major progressive developments in the realm of labour law is the notion 
of substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct.  
 
Prior to the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1994, the notion of 
substantive fairness was virtually absent from the labour law jurisprudence.  
Influenced by the socio-economic developments in South Africa as well as the 
International Labour Organisations recommendations, South African courts 
introduced the notion of substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct.   
 
The application of the novel notion of substantive fairness was first premised on the 
employer deference approach which was borrowed from s57(3) of the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978 (the English Statute).  The employer 
deference approach demanded that presiding officers must accord respect to the 
interest of the employers in determining substantive fairness in cases of dismissal.  
This approach was followed by contradictory judgements by South African courts – 
with some embracing the approach whilst other rejecting it. 
 
The South African approach to the notion of substantive fairness was eventually 
decided by the Constitutional Court in the case of Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg 
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Platinum Mines and Others1.  The Constitutional Court rejected the employer 
deference approach and replaced it with the exercise of value judgement by 
presiding officers which demands balancing the interests of employers and 
employees in determining the substantive fairness.  The court further, without being 
exhaustive, enumerated factors which must be taken into account in the process of 
establishing substantive fairness and these included the importance of the rule 
breached; the reason the employer imposed the sanction; the basis of the 
employee‟s challenge of dismissal; the harm caused by the employee‟s conduct; 
whether additional training may avoid repeat of the offence; the effect of dismissal on 
the employee and his or her record of long service.2 
 
Notwithstanding the Constitutional Court judgment, the exercise of value judgment 
remains vulnerable to arbitrary application if it is not anchored on a specified value to 
be protected. This vulnerability has been apparent in certain cases that followed the 
Sidumo case such as that of Theewaterskloof Municipality v South African Local 
Government Bargaining Council (Western Cape Division and Other)3 and Miyambo v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration.4  In both cases, the 
employees were dismissed for what may be argued as inconsequential acts of 
misconduct.    This was palpably against the spirit and purport of the precedent-
setting decision in the Sidumo case. 
 
                                                          
1
 (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC)  
2
 Supra, note 1, para 78 
3
 (2010) 31 ILJ 2475 (LC)  
4
 (2010) 31 ILJ 2031 (LAC)  
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This study proposes that the exercise of value judgment should be anchored on the 
constitutional value of dignity which is intrinsically interwoven with the right to work 
security. 
Recognizing the importance of dignity as the right was aptly articulated by Justice 
O‟Regan in the case of S v Makwanyane5 that: 
“recognizing the right to dignity is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic work of human 
beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. 
This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.”6 
 
If the right to dignity is the foundation of many rights, it stands to reason, therefore, 

















                                                          
5
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
6
 Supra, para 328 




1.  Introduction  
 
The principle that there must be substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for 
misconduct is an intrinsic part of the right to fair labour practices enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  There have been numerous efforts to 
identify the precise content of the notion of substantive fairness over time as the 
rights and obligations of both the employers and employees have been developed. 
However, the development of the notion of substantive fairness and its application by 
courts of law has neither been consistent nor uniformed.  The notion of substantive 
fairness has been a subject of debate from the Labour Court right up to the 
Constitutional Court.   
 
Prior to the Constitutional Court case of Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines and Others7, hereinafter referred to as Sidumo case, various contradictory 
decisions by the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court were arrived at in so far as 
the interpretation and application of the notion of substantive fairness is concerned.  
These contradictory decisions will be outlined in detail in chapter two of this study. In 
the Sidumo Case, the Constitutional Court sought to put the issue at rest by 
expressing what is entailed in the content of the notion of substantive fairness and 
how it should be applied.  In essence, the Constitutional Court found that the 
application of the notion of substantive fairness is premised on a value judgment to 
be exercised by a presiding officer.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                          
7
 (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 
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Notwithstanding this Constitutional Court judgement, the application of this principle 
is still susceptible to arbitrary application if the exercise of value judgement is not 
premised on clearly identified value such as the constitutional value of dignity.  There 
is also a “band of reasonableness”8 in the determination of substantive fairness 
within which one presiding officer‟s conclusion may differ with the other in the course 
of exercising a value judgment.  In this “band of reasonableness” one presiding 
officer may find it reasonably fair to dismiss while the other may find it reasonably 
unfair to dismiss.  In both instances, it may still happen that these positions both fall 
within the “band of reasonableness”   It is this possibility of arbitrary application that 
this study is concerned about. 
  
This chapter will set the scene for a critical analysis of the application of the notion of 
substantive fairness in dismissals for misconduct and will identify what this study 
seeks to achieve.   
 
2. Background of the study 
 
There is an inherent conflict of interests embedded in the employment relationship 
between employers and employees.  In the course of this conflict, each party 
exercises powers vested in it to protect and advance its own interests. It is generally 
accepted that in the employment relationship employers wield more power than 
employees, which can result in unscrupulous employers treating employees as 
commodities to be dispensed with at the will of such employers.   
 
                                                          
8
 British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift (1981) IRLR 91 (CA) para 11, page 93 
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The advent of democracy in South Africa heralded a new era in the employment 
relationship.  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa9, which is the supreme 
law of the land, and other legislation have codified rights, obligations and recourse of 
all parties involved in the employment relationship.  The foundation of these rights is 
s23(1) of the Constitution which provides that „everyone has a right to fair labour 
practice.‟  In the case of Nehawu v University of Cape Town10 the court, in 
interpreting the essence of s23(1), said: 
“the focus of s23 (1) of the Constitution is, broadly speaking, the relationship 
between the worker and the employer and the continuation of that relationship on 
terms that are fair to both.  In giving content to that right, it is important to bear in 
mind the tension between the interests of the workers and the interests of the 
employers‟ which is inherent to labour relations.  Care must therefore be taken to 
accommodate, where possible, these interests so as to arrive at the balance required 
by the concept of fair labour practices” 
 
The letter and spirit of s23 (1) of the Constitution has been further carried forward 
and elaborated on by the provisions of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995, 
as amended.  Section 1 of the LRA provides that the purpose of the Act is to: 
“Advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratization 
of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of the Act which are –  
(a) To give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by the section 27 
of the Constitution11; 
(b) To give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International Labour Organisation; 
(c) …” 
 
Section 3 of the LRA provides further that any person applying the Act must interpret 
its provisions – 
(a) “To give effect to its primary objects; 
                                                          
9
 Act 108 of 1996 
10
 (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC), para 40 
11
 Section 27 of the interim constitution.  In the current Constitution, rights on labour relations are provided 
for in section 23. 
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(b) In compliance with the Constitution ; and 
(c) In compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.” 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the LRA, therefore, constitute a 
much needed base for balancing the power relations between employers and 
employees. Notwithstanding these progressive developments of law and 
jurisprudence, the content and application of the notion of substantive fairness in 
cases of dismissal has remained elusive. There has been a lacuna in the application 
of law in determining substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct.   
Andre Van Niekerk in his article titled „Dismissal for misconduct – Ghost of justice, 
past, present and future‟12 makes a point that: 
“The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 fails to articulate a normative foundation from 
which the right not to be unfairly deprived of work security might be derived.  While 
the courts have established [that] the determination of a fair sanction for workplace 
misconduct necessarily entails a value judgment, they have failed to recognize that 
the principled decision-making requires a coherent conception of justice…a 
conception of justice more closely aligned with constitutional values of dignity and 
autonomy requires that the sanction of dismissal is a rational response to employer 
goals of economic efficiency, and that a relationship of reasonable proportionality 
exists between the sanction and those goals.”13 
 
In common law, the notion of substantive fairness did not feature at all and the 
decision to dismiss purely rested on the contractual agreement between an employer 
and employee.  This meant that for an employee to challenge dismissal, the 
employee had to prove breach of a material term of the contract of employment.  The 
common law application continued until the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 
94 of 1979, hereinafter referred to as the 1979 Amendment Act, which introduced the 
concept of fair labour practice.  Nonetheless, the 1979 Amendment Act made no 
                                                          
12
  A Van Niekerk ‘Dismissal for misconduct – Ghosts of justice, past, present and future’, (2012) Acta Juridica: 
Reinventing Labour Law: reflecting on the first 15 years of Labour Relations Act and future challenges 102 - 119 
13
 Supra, page 102 
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mention of the notion of substantive fairness.  The historical development of this 
aspect of law will be dealt with in detail in chapter two of this study. 
 
The concept of fair labour practice now finds expression in the Bill of Rights set out 
in the Constitution.  It has been further elaborated in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, item 7 of Code of Good Practice: Dismissal as well as the CCMA Guidelines: 
Misconduct Arbitration14 which stipulates factors that need to be taken into account 
by commissioners in the process of balancing the interests of employers and 
employees when determining substantive fairness of the sanction for misconduct.  
The law that is in application will be discussed in detail in chapter three of this study. 
 
When the courts were faced with the predicament of interpretation and application of 
the novel right to fair labour practice as introduced by the Industrial Conciliation Act 
94 of 1979, they borrowed from the English Law jurisprudence where commissioners 
were expected to defer to the interests of the employer when determining 
substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct.   This jurisprudence found 
prominence after the Labour Appeals Court case of Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v 
Khoza15 where the court found as follows: 
“The determination of an appropriate sanction is a matter which is largely within the 
discretion of the employer.  However, this discretion must be exercised fairly.  A court 
should, therefore, not lightly interfere with the sanction imposed by the employer 
unless the employer acted unfairly in imposing the sanction.  The question is not 
whether the court would have imposed the sanction imposed by the employer, but 
whether in the circumstances of the case the sanction was reasonable.”16 
 
                                                          
14
 The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal,  Schedule 8 of the LRA  and CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations  
contained in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
15
 [1999] 2 BLLR 108 (LAC) 
16
 Supra, para 33 
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In the case of County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others17 Ngcobo AJP (as he 
then was) delivered the following dictum: 
“Commissioners must approach their functions with caution.  They must bear in mind 
that their awards are final – there is no appeal against their awards.  In particular, 
commissioners must exercise greater caution when they consider the fairness of the 
sanction imposed by an employer.  They should not interfere with the sanction 
merely because they do not like it.  There must be a measure of deference to the 
sanction imposed by the employer subject to the requirements that the sanction 
imposed by the employer must be fair.  The rationale for this is that it is primarily the 
function of the employer to decide upon the proper sanction.”18 
 
The two above-mentioned dicta from the case of County Fair Foods and Nampak 
were cited with approval in the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and 
Others.19 The Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the appeal of the decision from 
the Labour Appeal Court which had, confirming the decision of the Labour Court, 
effectively jettisoned the approach of affording a measure of deference to the 
sanction imposed by the employer.   
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the Labour Appeal Court 
and reaffirmed that commissioners should exercise a measure of deference to the 
employer‟s decision.  Cameron JA said: 
“it is in my view regrettable that the Labour Appeal Court has not consistently 
affirmed and applied the analysis.  Although some panels have affirmed Ngcobo 
AJP‟s approach, this case indicates how far the practice of the Labour Appeal Court 
has on occasion strayed from it…instead of exhorting commissioners to exercise 
greater caution when intervening, and to show a measure of deference to the 
employer‟s sanction so long as it is fair, it has insulated commissioners‟ decisions 
from intervention by importing unduly constrictive criteria into review process.”20 
 
                                                          
17
 [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC) 
18
 Supra, note 10,  para 28 
19
 (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA), para 41 - 42 
20
 (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA) at para 41 
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal was taken to the Constitutional Court 
as the case of Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines and Others21(the 
Sidumo Case).  The Constitutional Court overturned the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and re-affirmed the decision of the Labour Appeal Court – thereby 
by effectively rejecting the approach of deferring to the decision of the employer.  
The Constitutional Court replaced the approach of deferring to the sanction by the 
employer with one in terms of which the interests of both the employer and the 
employees are balanced in an objective manner.  The full impact of this case and the 
jurisprudence it established will be discussed in great detail in chapter three.   
 
An important finding in the Sidumo Case is that the content of the right to substantive 
fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct entails the exercise of value judgment 
by the presiding officers.  However, the exercise of the value judgment not premised 
on the constitutional values of dignity may still be open to arbitrary application.  This 
possibility was acknowledged in the Sidumo Case, where Ngcobo J held that 
“however objective determination of fairness of dismissal might be, it is a 
determination based upon a value judgement.  Indeed the exercise of a value 
judgment is something about which reasonable people may readily differ”22 
Ngcobo J further held that: 
“… it could not have been the intention of the law-maker to leave the determination of 
fairness to the unconstrained value judgement of the commissioner. Were that to have 
been the case the outcome of a dispute could be determined by the background and 
perspective of the commissioner…yet fairness requires that regards must be had to the 
interests both of the workers and those of the employer”23 
 
                                                          
21
 (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 
22
 (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC), page 91, para 179 
23
 Supra, para 91 
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In spite of the progressive development of law relating to the notion of 
substantive fairness as articulated above, the prevailing jurisprudence still has a 
lacuna which, if not remedied, has a potential of defeating the intention of the 




3.  Aims and Objectives 
 
As it has been noted above, the approach of balancing the interests of the employer 
and the employee, and taken together with the exercise of value judgement does not 
essentially provide the “normative foundation for a coherent conception of justice”24 
in determining fairness.  The guidelines as enunciated in the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissals and CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitration25 remains, arguably, 
nothing more than guidelines whose weight is heavily subjected, in essence, to the 
whims of the exercise of the value judgement.  Equally, value judgement itself, whilst 
now constrained by the factors that must be taken into account in determining 
substantive fairness, is, as correctly noted by Ngcobo J in the Sidumo Case, 
susceptible to producing arbitrary decisions based on the background and 
perspective of the commissioner concerned. 
 
The purpose of this study is to propose the application of the constitutional value of 
dignity to underpin the exercise of value judgement in determining substantive 
fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct.  It will start by giving a brief account on 
                                                          
24
 A Van Niekerk ‘Dismissal for misconduct – Ghosts of justice, past, present and future’, (2012) Acta Juridica: 
Reinventing Labour Law: reflecting on the first 15 years of Labour Relations Act and future challenges 102 - 119 
25
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
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the development of law governing determination of the notion of substantive fairness 
in cases of dismissal for misconduct and subsequently provide a critical analysis of 
the existing law governing substantive fairness in dismissal of employees for 
misconduct. The current law which is based on the exercise of value judgement in 
balancing the interests of the employer and employees was developed by the 
Constitutional Court Case of Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines and 
Others26 (the Sidumo Case).  
 
The study is concerned only with dismissal in the form of the termination of a 
contract of employment, with or without notice, by an employer for reasons of 
misconduct excluding misconduct in the form of engaging in unprotected strike 
action.  It is further limited to considering the determination of substantive fairness 
and does not extend to procedural fairness. 
 
 
4.  Methodology  
 
This is a desktop study and its methodology will be based on the review of primary 
and secondary sources.  The sources that will be consulted include legislation, case 
law, books, academic articles and/or journals. 
 
 
                                                          
26
 (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 
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5. Structure of dissertation 
Chapter One provides an introduction and aims and objective of the study.  The 
introduction sets the scene for the critical analysis of law relating to substantive 
fairness in dismissal for misconduct.  The aims and objectives set out what the study 
seeks to achieve. 
 
Chapter Two of this study will focus of providing background and historical 
development of the law governing substantive fairness in dismissal for misconduct.  
The chapter will also contain the literature review.   
 
Chapter Three will discuss the current law governing the determining of substantive 
fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct as an appropriate sanction.  This 
chapter will, therefore, deal in detail with the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the 
provisions of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, the CCMA Guidelines: 
Misconduct Arbitrations, as well as the jurisprudence established by the Sidumo 
Case.  
 
Chapter Four will discuss the shortcomings in the current approach to determining 
the substantive fairness in dismissal for misconduct.  It will further discuss the 
suggested alternative to the current approach which is based on the importance of 
the right to dignity in the context of determining substantive fairness in dismissal as a 
sanction as well as provide a conclusion 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
South African labour law has evolved as both political and socio-economic conditions 
in the country have changed over the successive decades.  From the common law 
position on employment relations, statutes were introduced and amendments 
effected in order to meet the demands of each particular epoch.  South African 
labour law was, before the democratic breakthrough, reflective of the South African 
system of government that discriminated against people on the basis of colour.   The 
development of common law through the labour law statutes and their subsequent 
amendments were in the main informed by the economic demands of the employers 
as opposed to the need of protecting workers irrespective of their colour.   
 
As labour law developed, two contending schools of thoughts emerged in the course 
of determining substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct.  The first 
school of thought was that of a reasonable employer and/or deferring to the interests 
of the employer when determining substantive fairness.  This school of thought, as 
will be shown below emerged from s57(3) of the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the English statute, and the 
case of British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift27 
 
In South Africa, the reasonable employer test was also heavily influenced by the 
nature of the system of government at the time.  It is common knowledge that the 
employers were mainly of white origin and the system of apartheid was designed to 
                                                          
27
 [1981] IRLR 91 (CA) 
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protect their interests.  With the law at the time designed to protect the interest of 
people of white origin who were mainly the employers and exploiters of cheap labour 
from people of colour, the Africans, it only followed that the judiciary would defer to 
the interests of employers when interpreting and applying the notion of substantive 
fairness in cases of dismissal.   
 
The second school of thought is one referred to as the “own opinion” approach which 
emerged in the case of Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCMA & Others.28  According to this 
approach, an arbitrator is empowered to decide substantive fairness in a case of 
dismissal for misconduct according to his/her opinion and/or judgment of what is fair 
or unfair without deferring to the employer.29   
 
This chapter will briefly trace the historical developments of the South African labour 
law in relation to the notion of substantive fairness.  It will further deal with the case 
law that has dealt with the interpretation and application of the notion of substantive 
fairness in terms of the current law.  This study will deal both with the cases that 
favoured the employer deference approach in establishing substantive fairness as 





                                                          
28
 [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC) 
29
 Supra, at page 73 
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2.2 Historical Development 
2.2.1 Common Law 
In common law, the principles underpinning work security, as now enunciated by the 
Constitution and LRA, did not obtain.   Employees rights were confined to those 
provided for in the contract of employment.  The common law position resulted in 
employment being “employment at will”, where either party in the contract, employer 
or employee, could terminate employment provided such termination met the 
contractual provisions.30  In essence, the relationship between the employer and 
employee was purely regulated by the provisions of the employment contract 
entered into by parties concerned.      
 
In an instance where an employer terminated the contract by way of dismissing an 
employee, the employer was under no obligation to reveal reasons for dismissal to 
the employee nor to justify the dismissal, provided such dismissal was in accordance 
with the general law of contract.  The decision to dismiss was a managerial decision 
– a decision that could not be tampered with to the extent that it complied with the 
contractual terms between an employer and employee.  Where an employer 
dismissed an employee, with or without notice or with inadequate contractual notice, 
the employee could only claim damages based on the breach of contract.  However, 
the courts generally refused to order specific performance where breach was 
established.31 
                                                          
30
N Cassim  ‘Unfair Dismissal’ (1984) 5 Industrial Law Journal 276 
31
 National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings 1982 (4) SA 151 (T),  (1982) 3 ILJ at 285 
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The common law position had a glaring weakness which rendered employees 
vulnerable and reliant on the whims of unscrupulous employers.  It failed to 
appreciate and fairly regulate the power struggle between the employers and 
employees.  As noted by Nazeer Cassim: 
“The common law views the employer and the employee as free and equal 
contracting parties, ignoring the obvious discrepancy in their bargaining power and 
the fact that the employment relationship provides income to a family unit for the 
employee and constitute a cost of production or service for the employer.”32 
 
In essence, the major deficiency of the common law was that it could not intervene to 
protect the interests of employees beyond the terms of the employment contract. 
Employers were left with unconstrained power over the employees to the extent that 
job security for employees was never protected by law but depended on the wishes 




2.1.2 The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979 
On the recommendation of the Wiehahm Commission33, the government passed the 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979, hereinafter referred to as the 
1979 Act.  The 1979 Act established the Industrial Court and introduced the concept 
of unfair labour practice.  However, the definition of unfair labour practice made no 
mention of termination of employment or of any right or recourse against an 
                                                          
32
 N Cassim ‘Unfair Dismissal’ (1984) 5 Industrial Law Journal 276 
33
 The Wiehahn Commission was set up by the government after the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Soweto 
uprisings of 1976 to look at industrial relations system in South Africa. - See more at: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/wiehahn-commission-report-tabled-
parliament#sthash.YhJQZAEd.dpuf (accessed on 16 July 2016) 
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employer when employment had been terminated in circumstances that could be 
regarded as unfair.  Brassey M further makes a point that: 
“the legislation gave no direct indication of the principles required to inform 
this fundamental shift from the common law market-based paradigm which 
acknowledged different precepts for the regulation of the security of 
employment…there was no clear articulation of the far-reaching limitation that 
was to be placed on a power that had long been sacrosanct – the almost 
unbridled power of an employer to dismiss”34. 
 
In spite of the absence from the 1979 Act of clear articulation on fairness in 
dismissal, the Industrial Court, with the influence of the international labour 
standards, particularly the International Labour Organisation Recommendation 11935 
developed a jurisprudence which gave rise to the concept of unfair labour practice as 
including a requirement that dismissal needed to be substantively and procedurally 
fair.   
 
The articulation of the concept of fairness in dismissal by the Industrial Court marked 
a departure from the common law paradigm as described above. It provided that an 
employer was required to justify a decision to terminate an employee‟s employment 
and that the employer‟s reason had to be fair and taken after the employer had 
followed a fair procedure.36 
 
 
                                                          
34
 M Brassey  et al.  The New Labour Law: Strike, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law 
[1987] 98 
35
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:15601953883899::NO::P12100_SHOW_TEXT:Y:                  
(accessed on the 16 July 2016)  
36
 A Van Niekerk ‘Dismissal for misconduct – Ghosts of justice, past, present and future’, 2012  Acta Juridica: 
Reinventing labour law: reflecting on the first 15 years of the Labour Relations Act and future challenges 104 
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2.1.3 International Labour Organisation Recommendation 119 
The development of the law in relation to substantive fairness in cases of dismissal 
was further heavily influenced by the Recommendation 11937 of the International 
Labour Organisation, hereinafter referred to as the ILO, which South Africa is a 
member of.  The ILO emerged after the Second World War to give expression to the 
reforms that grew with the industrial revolution and the need to deal with labour 
standards at an international level.  South Africa was re-admitted to the ILO in 1994 
after it withdrew in 1964 as a result of political pressure associated with the demand 
to abolish the Apartheid system.   
 
The ILO is a very crucial and credible source of international labour standards.  Its 
recommendations and conventions have laid a monumental foundation for significant 
development of international labour standard and codes across the globe.  In 1963 
the ILO met in Geneva and adopted Recommendation 119 which proved to have 
wide positive effect in South African employment relations and had a great impact on 
South African courts‟ interpretation of fairness or lack of in cases of dismissals.   The 
Recommendation provided, amongst other things, that the termination of 
employment should be founded on valid reasons connected to the capacity or 
conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the business.38  
 
The Recommendation 119 further provided that if a worker is of the view that the 
termination of his employment was unjustifiable, that worker was entitled to appeal, 
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within a reasonable time, against such termination to a body established under a 
collective agreement or a neutral body such as a court or an arbitration committee.39  
These bodies are empowered to examine the reasons advanced for termination of 
employment and any other necessary circumstances pertinent to the case and make 




2.1.4 Evolution of the reasonable employer test 
The absence of a clear articulation of substantive fairness in common law and earlier 
statutes led our courts to borrow from the English Law regarding determination of 
substantive fairness.  The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, 
hereinafter referred to as the English Statute, had established a principle of the 
reasonable employer test in determining fairness or otherwise of the sanction of 
dismissal.  The test is premised on the notion that if an employer imposes a sanction 
on an employee that falls within the „band of reasonable‟ sanctions that can be 
imposed, a tribunal is prevented from interfering with that decision.40   
 
Section 57(3) of the English Statute provided as follows: 
“The determination of the question whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, having 
regard to the reasons shown by the employer, shall depend on whether in the 
circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer‟s 
undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a 
sufficient reason for dismissing the employee; and that question shall be determined 
in accordance with equity and the substantive merits of the case.” 
 




 T Cohen “The Reasonable Employer Test – Creeping in Through the Back Door?”  SA Mercantile Law Journal, 
2003, Vol 15, Issue 2, page 192 
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In the case of British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift41 Lord Denning in his judgment 
expounded on the inquiry into fairness as provided for by the provisions of the 
English Statute.   His explanation has been frequently quoted in support of the 
reasonable employer test and reads as follows:  
“The first question that arises is whether the Industrial Tribunal applied the wrong 
test.  We have had considerable argument about it.  They said: „…a reasonable 
employer would, in our opinion, have considered that a lesser penalty was 
appropriate‟. I do not think that this is right test.  The correct test is: Was it 
reasonable for the employers to dismiss him? If no reasonable employer would have 
dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair.  But if a reasonable employer might 
reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair.  It must be remembered 
that in all these cases there is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer 
might reasonably take one view: another quite reasonably take a different view.  One 
would quite reasonably dismiss the man.  The other would quite reasonably keep him 
on.  Both views may be quite reasonable.  If it was quite reasonable to dismiss him, 
then the dismissal must be upheld as fair: even though some other employers may 
not have dismissed him” 
 
In essence the reasonable employer test demanded that commissioners must use 
their powers to intervene with caution because the discretion to dismiss lay with the 
employer.  To the extent that such discretion is exercised fairly, commissioners had 
to afford the sanction of dismissal a measure of deference.   
 
2.2 CASE LAW 
2.2.1 Cases in favour of the reasonable employer test 
The early cases that were decided by courts were in favour of the reasonable 
employer test as a determinant factor in establishing substantive fairness in cases of 
dismissal.  The two leading cases in favour of the reasonable employer test were the 
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case of Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza42 and the case of County Fair Foods 
v CCMA and Others.43   
 
Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza44 
This is a Labour Appeal Court case where the respondent had been employed by 
the appellant as a boiler attendant for some 15 years.  The respondent was 
described in evidence as very experienced boiler attendant and he had received 
proper training as a boiler attendant.  The respondent was charged with gross 
negligence as a result of damage caused to the boiler.  At the conclusion of the 
disciplinary hearing, the chairperson found that the damage to the boiler had been 
caused by the exposure of the grate to too high temperature for a prolonged period.  
He further found that had the correct procedure been followed, the damage would 
not have been caused.  The respondent was accordingly found guilty of gross 
negligence of the highest degree and, having found no mitigating circumstances, the 
chairperson recommended a dismissal.   
 
The respondent challenged his dismissal and referred the dispute to the Industrial 
Court for a determination in terms of section 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 
1956.  Before the court, the respondent put in issue the substantive fairness of his 
dismissal. The court concluded that, from the facts, the respondent was negligent.  
However, it could not find that he was grossly negligent due to the circumstantial 
nature of evidence as to the cause of negligence.   
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The court found that, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the 
sanction of dismissal was too harsh and constituted an unfair labour practice.  It 
ordered that the respondent be reinstated in his employment.   
 
On appeal, the court held that: 
“the determination of an appropriate sanction is a matter which is largely within the 
discretion of the employer.  However, this discretion must be exercised fairly.  A court 
should, therefore, not lightly interfere with the sanction imposed by the employer 
unless the employer acted unfairly in imposing the sanction.  The question is not 
whether the court would have imposed the sanction imposed by the employer, but 
whether in the circumstances of the case the sanction was reasonable.”45  
 
The court further held that the correct test to apply in determining whether or not a 
dismissal was fair was enunciated by Lord Denning in the case of British UK Limited 
v Swift46 as discussed above.  Influenced by the test articulated by Lord Denning, the 
Labour Appeal Court held that it was not unreasonable for the appellant to dismiss 
the respondent.  The trust which is fundamental in an employer/employee 
relationship was broken.   
 
 County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others47 
The respondent employee and Ms Smit, a fellow employee, had been involved in a 
relationship.  Ms Smit ended the relationship.  The respondent employee was 
unhappy and, during the late night shift at work, tried to speak to her in an attempt to 
revive the relationship.  Ms Smit refused to speak to him and, in order to avoid him, 
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went into the ladies‟ cloakroom.  He followed her and tried to force her to sit on his 
lap.  Ms Smit swore at him and he then hit her twice with a broomstick, hard enough 
to leave marks.  Other female employees witnessed the incident. 
 
Pursuant to a disciplinary enquiry, the employee was dismissed for assaulting Ms 
Smit.  At arbitration proceedings, the CCMA confirmed the finding of assault, but 
considered the sanction of dismissal too harsh.  The commissioner characterized the 
assault as a private matter and considered the history of the romantic relationship to 
be a mitigating factor.  The commissioner ordered the re-employment of the 
employee on a final written warning valid for one year.  On review, the Labour Court 
confirmed the award, save for substituting the work „reinstatement‟ for „re-
employment‟. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court overturned the decision of the Labour Court and the award 
by the commissioner.  Kroon JA held as follows: 
“it was not for the arbitrator to determine de novo what would be a fair sanction, but 
rather to determine whether the sanction imposed by the employer was fair.  It 
remains part of our law that it lies in the first place within the province of the employer 
to set the standard of conduct to be observed by its employees and to determine the 
sanction with which non-compliance with the standard will be visited.  Interference 
therewith is only justified in the case of unreasonableness or unfairness.”48 
 
In light of the facts set out above and the legal position observed in the preceding 
paragraph, Kroon JA came to a conclusion that there was no rational objective basis 
that existed in terms of which the arbitrator‟s decision not to endorse the employer‟s 
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decision that the third respondent be dismissed was justifiable.  The judge further 
held that  
“even if the correct approach was that the arbitrator could decide de novo on 
what would constitute a fair sanction, his decision that fairness demanded a 
lesser sanction than dismissal was not justifiable on any rational objective 
basis.  The absence of that basis results in the arbitrator‟s award being 
vitiated by gross irregularity; as a result it stood to be overturned”49. 
 
In the concurring judgment, Ngcobo AJP observed as follows: 
“Given the finality of the awards and the limited power of the Labour Court to 
interfere with the awards, Commissioners must approach their functions with caution.  
They must bear in mind that their awards are final – there is no appeal against their 
awards.  In particular, commissioners must exercise greater caution when they 
consider the fairness of the sanction imposed by an employer.  They should not 
interfere with the sanction merely because they do not like it.  There must be a 
measure of deference to the sanction imposed by the employer subject to the 
requirements that the sanction imposed by the employer must be fair.  The rationale 
for this is that it is primarily the function of the employer to decide upon the proper 
sanction.”50 
 
Ngcobo AJP further cited with approval the dictum of Brassey AJ in the case of 
Computicket v Marcus NO and Others51 where he held as follows: 
“The question of sanction for misconduct is one on which reasonable people can 
readily differ.  One person may consider that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for 
an offence, another that something less, such as a warning, would be appropriate.  
There are obviously circumstances in which a reasonable person would naturally 
conclude that dismissal was the appropriate sanction, for example if there had been 
theft of a significant amount of money, fraud or other untrustworthy conduct on the 
part of the respondent.”52 
 
The 1979 Act and its subsequent amendments made no provision within the 
definition of „unfair labour practice‟ for deferring to the employer when determining 
substantive fairness.  It appears that the basis for this approach is informed by the 
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stance that the decision to dismiss, presumably just like a decision to employ and set 
codes of conduct at the work place, is within the province of the employer.  The 
employer may decide, as long as his decision falls within a “band of 
reasonableness”, to impose any sanction he deems fit.  The approach of deferring to 
the employer places prime value to the interests of the employer.  The inquiry seems 
to be from the standpoint not of the interest of the employee as a victim but of the 
employer who has powers to determine the conduct at the work place and sanctions 
of non-compliance with the set standards of conduct.  
 
The test involved in this approach was aptly articulated in the English case of British 
Leyland UK Ltd v Swift53 where the court held that “the correct test is: was it 
reasonable for the employer to dismiss? In no reasonable employer would have 
dismissed, then the dismissal was unfair.”54  In terms of this test, the decision of the 
employer to dismiss the employee may only be interfered with to the extent that “it is 
so unfair that it makes him whistle or unless it is so excessive as to shock one’s 
sense of fairness or is it unfair that no reasonable employer would have regarded it 
as a fair sanction.”55 
 
The thesis advanced in the cases above does not strike a proper balance between 
the interests of the parties in the employment contract.  An appropriate balancing act 
requires that while taking into consideration employers interests which are about 
right to the economic activity and protection of business interests, due regard must 
be given to the fact that  in the employment relationship, employers command more 
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power than employees because they own the means of production and are driven by 
the need for profit maximization.  On the other hand, employees depend on selling 
their labour for them to survive.  As such, a decision to dismiss an employee will 
have dire consequences on the dignity and continued survival of the affected 
employee.   
 
2.2.2 Cases in favour the “own opinion” approach 
The need to afford more protection to workers and to attempt to strike equilibrium 
between the interests of the parties in the employment relationship could no longer 
be ignored by some courts who jettisoned the employer deference approach in 
favour of a more balanced approach.  The alternative to the employer deference 
approach came to be known as the “own opinion” approach and was defined by 
Zondo JP as meaning that the arbitrator is required to determine fairness or lack of in 
case of dismissal for misconduct according to his own opinion of what is fair given 
the totality of the circumstances of the case.56 
 
Amongst the leading cases that ruled in favour of the “own opinion” approach include 
Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation of South 
Africa Ltd (Perskor),57 which ruled in favour of courts applying moral judgement in 
deciding substantive fairness and Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCM & Others58, which 
enunciated in clear terms the concept of the “own opinion” approach. 
 
                                                          
56
 Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCM & Others [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC) at para 1 
57
 1992 (4) SA 791 (A)  
58
 [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC) 
28 | P a g e  
 
Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation of 
South Africa Ltd (Perskor)59 
 
 
This was an appeal case which dealt with two questions that were put to issue by the 
Appeal Court.  The first question, which is relevant in this study, was whether the 
Judge in the Labour Appeal Court was correct in finding that the assessors had no 
part to play in deciding the question as to whether or not the facts found constituted 
an unfair labour practice.  The Labour Appeal Court had found that the assessors 
had no part in deciding the question of unfair labour practice and it based its decision 
on the ground that this decision is a decision on the question of law which is an 
exclusive domain of the Chairman in terms of Section 17A (3)(e)(ii) of the 1958 Act.   
 
The Appellate Division came to a different conclusion and heavily based its 
reasoning on the writing of Salmond on Jurisprudence60.  According to Salmond, as 
quoted in the judgement, matters and questions that come before the court fall under 
three categories and these are: 
i) “Matters and questions of law – all that are determined by authoritative legal 
principles; 
ii) Questions of fact – which includes all questions that are not questions of law. 
iii) Matters and questions of judicial discretion – all matters and question as to what 
is right, just, equitable or reasonable except those determined by the law. In such 
matters, it is the duty of the court to exercise its moral judgment in order to 
ascertain the right and justice of the case”61. 
 
The Appellate Division felt that the issue of what constitute fairness falls under 
questions of judicial discretion where the court must exercise its moral judgement.  
Considering the provisions of the 1958 Act, the Appellate Division further held that 
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“the Legislature clearly intended that assessors would play a useful role in the 
determination of disputes concerning unfair practices.  It seems most unlikely that the 
Legislature would have intended this role would have been limited to the 
determination of what the fact are as distinct from the ultimate decision whether such 




Engen Petroleum v CCMA and Others63 
The third respondent, one of the truck drivers of the appellant, was dismissed at the 
disciplinary hearing after being found guilty of making unauthorized stops and 
tempering with the tachograph fitted in his truck which records the movement of the 
truck.  During the arbitration, although the third responded continued to deny that he 
had tampered with the tachograph, the second respondent, based on evidence 
presented by the tachograph analyst, concluded that the third responded had 
tampered with the tachograph.  However, the second respondent came to the 
conclusion that the dismissal as a sanction was in the circumstances too severe and 
that the appellant should have given the third respondent a final written warning 
instead of dismissal. 
 
Aggrieved with the award, the appellant brought an application to the Labour Court 
to have the award reviewed and set aside on the ground that the second respondent 
had committed gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and 
that he had exceeded his powers.  The Labour Court dismissed the application. 
While the Labour Appeal Court followed the precedent of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the case of Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA64 the court found that 
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it was never a legal position of the 1979 Act that arbitrators had to defer to the 
employer in determining substantive fairness.  The 1979 Act required the Industrial 
court to “determine” a dispute, the Labour Appeal Court to “decide” an appeal and 
the Appellate Division to “confirm, amend or set aside” a decision of the Labour 
Appeal Court concerning fairness of dismissal65.  Flowing from this, the Labour 
Appeal Court came to the conclusion that it was inescapable to concluded that the 
1979 Act envisaged passing a moral or value judgment (“own opinion”) in 
determining whether or not the dismissal as sanction was unfair and that the 
arbitrator was required to decide with his own opinion or judgment of what is fair or 
unfair given the totality of the circumstances of each case.66 
 
The rejection of the employer deference approach was confirmed in numerous cases 
in various levels of courts.  In the case of Toyota South Africa v Radebe and 
Others67 Nicholson JA remarked that: 
 “I do not believe that the reasonable employer test is part of our law… I believe that 
the application of the reasonable employer test was such a palpable mistake which 
permits us to overrule it.  The failure to take it into account is therefore not a gross 
irregularity.”68  
 
It is apparent from the above case law that the South African courts, for a very long 
period of time, failed to settle the inconsistences in the determination of the notion of 
substantive fairness in case of dismissal for misconduct.  The conflicting judgements 
passed by the South African courts were evident of the absence of clear articulation 
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of the right to substantive fairness by statues of the time.  The absence of this clear 
articulation led to some courts borrowing from the English Law which resulted in the 
adoption of the employer deference approach.  On the other hand, some courts 
reject the adoption of the employer deference approach and adopted the route of 






























The notion of substantive fairness is now embedded in the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the Labour Relations Act and the 
jurisprudence as developed in the case of Sidumo and Another v Restenburg 
Platinum Mines69 (Sidumo Case).  The Code of Good Practice: Dismissals70 as well 
as the Guidelines for Commissioners71 further seek to provide clarity on how 
presiding officers should go about ascertaining the notion of substantive fairness in 
cases of dismissal for misconduct.  This chapter will deal in detail with the notion of 
substantive fairness as enunciated by the above-mentioned Acts, Guidelines and in 
the Sidumo Case. 
 
3.2 Constitution of the Republic of South African 
South Africa has a constitutional democracy system of governance and the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land.  Any law that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution shall be declared invalid.  The Constitution further requires that any law 
should be interpreted and developed in line with the letter, spirit and purport of the 
constitution.   
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has a right to fair labour 
practice.  The essence of this provision was well articulated in the Constitutional 
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Court case of Nehawu v University of Cape Town72 where the court held that section 
23(1) was mainly about striking the balance between the contracting parties as well 
as fairness in the continued employment relationship between the employer and the 
employee.   
 
Again in the Sidumo Case, the Constitutional Court found that  
“there is nothing in the constitutional and statutory scheme that suggests that, in 
determining the fairness of a dismissal, a commissioner must approach the matter 
from the perspective of the employer.  All indications are to the contrary. A plain 
reading of all the relevant provisions compels the conclusion that the commissioner is 
to determine the dismissal dispute as an impartial adjudicator.”73 
 
Flowing from the two Constitutional Court cases cited above, it is apparent that the 
court has been consistent in rejecting the „defer to the employer‟ approach and 
finding it to be inconsistent with the Constitution.  According to the Constitutional 
Court, the principle of fairness, as required by the Constitution, demands that due 
regard be given to balancing the interests of both the employer and the employer.   
 
3.3 Labour Relations Act 66 Of 1995 
 
The letter and spirit of section 23(1) of the Constitution has been carried forward by 
the provisions of the LRA.  The LRA has as its purpose the advancement of 
economic development, social justice, labour peace and democratization of the 
workplace.  It further aims to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution and give 
effect to the obligations of the International Labour Organisation in which South 
Africa is a member.74 
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In terms of s85 of the LRA every employee has the right not to be- 
(a) Unfairly dismissed; and 
(b) … 
 
Section 188 of the LRA requires that a dismissal, if it is not automatically unfair, must 
be for a fair reason and anyone who is to determine whether the dismissal was fair 
or not must have due regard to the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal.   
 
As noted above, amongst the objects of the LRA is to give effect to the obligations of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO).  In terms of Article 8(1) of the ILO 
Conventions on Termination of Employment 158 of 198275, an employee who deems 
termination of employment to be unjustifiable is entitled to appeal to an impartial 
body.  Article 9 (1) of the same convention provides that an impartial body referred in 
Article 8 (1) is empowered to interrogate the reasons for termination and further 
determine whether the termination was justified.  Furthermore, Article 10 provides 
that if the impartial body arrives at a determination, having considered the reasons 
and circumstances relating to the case, then it has discretion to decide on the 
appropriate award. 
 
Emanating from the succinct provisions of the ILO Convention on Termination of 
Employment 158 of 1982 which rejects the „defer to the employer‟ approach and 
empowers an impartial body to decide on the appropriate award should it find that 
the termination of employment was unfair, the objects of the LRA compels that the 
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Act be interpreted in line with this Convention as well as the Constitution as 
explained above.   
 
3.4 Code of Good Practice: dismissal and CCMA guidelines: misconduct 
arbitrations 
Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 contains the code of good 
practice which spells out guidelines to be followed in misconduct arbitrations.  These 
guidelines have, however, been crafted in broad and general terms in order to allow 
special circumstances of each case and to further give room for departure on the 
guidelines if such is justified given the peculiarity of the circumstances.   
 
Item 7 of the Code of Good Practice provides that a presiding officer who seeks to 
ascertain fairness in the case of dismissal for misconduct should consider the 
following: 
(a) Whether or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating 
conduct at the workplace; 
 
The factual inquiry at the stage involves two dimensions which are determining the 
existence of the rule and whether the rule has been contravened.  It is common 
practice that a rule will be contained in the employer‟s code of conduct.  However, 
employers are not obliged to pronounce in detail every workplace rule; it is sufficient 
that employees are made aware that certain forms of misconduct are proscribed and 
of the consequences of committing that misconduct.76  
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Rules of workplace may also be inferred from the common law duties in relation to 
the workplace.  Rules emanating from common law include acting in good faith 
towards the employer, performance, obeying reasonable and lawful instructions and 
to work with due diligence and skills.  In the case of breach of common law rule(s), 
the employer is not required to prove the existence of an express provision either in 
the employment contract or the code of conduct.  In the case of Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v 
CWIU & Another77, Joffe JA (as he then was) held that: 
“Where misconduct does not fall within the express terms of a disciplinary code, the 
misconduct my still be of such a nature that the employer may nonetheless be 
entitled to discipline the employee…In our view the competence of an employer to 
discipline an employee for misconduct not covered in a disciplinary code depends on 
a multi-faceted factual enquiry.  This enquiry include but not limited to the nature of 
the misconduct, the nature of the work performed by the employee, the employer‟s 
size, the nature and size of the employer‟s work-force, the position which the 
employer occupies in the market and its profile therein, the nature of the work or 
services performed by the employer, the relationship between the employee and the 
victim, the impact of the misconduct on the work-force as a whole, as well as on the 
relationship between employer and employee and the capacity of the employee to 
perform his job.  At the end of the enquiry what would have to be determined is if the 
employees‟ misconduct had the effect of destroying, or of seriously damaging, the 
relationship of employer and employee.”78 
 
 
If the rule is neither contained in the employer‟s disciplinary code of conduct nor can 
be inferred from the common law practice, the rule can still be inferred from the 
written contract of employment, legislation(s), or practice in the sector.   For 
example, there are rules that will arise from duties imposed by the legislation such as 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993.  Special rules may also emanate 
from sector such as stricter standards of compliance in sectors with high risk of 
safety and security. 
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The second dimension entails a determination whether the employees conduct 
complained about contravened the rule.  This involves proving the facts of the 
employee‟s conduct and applying the rule to such proven facts to establish whether 
such conduct is covered by the rule.  The standard of proof is on the balance of 
probabilities.  
 
Flowing form the above, it is apparent that an employee may not always succeed in 
arguing unfairness on the basis that the rule was not included in the disciplinary code 




(b) If a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not-  
 
(i) The rule was valid or reasonable rule or standard 
 
 
Once the existence of the rule has been established and that the employee has 
actually contravened it, the next factual inquiry is whether the rule was valid or 
reasonable.  The rule will be regarded as invalid if it is unlawful and/or contrary to 
public policy.  If the rule compels an employee to undertake an unlawful act, such as 
that prohibited by legislation, the employee is free to disregard it.   
 
Another aspect of this inquiry is whether the rule is reasonable.  Grogan points out 
that:   
“generally, a rule is deemed unreasonable if it is not relevant to the 
workplace or to the employee‟s work, if the rule requires an employee 
to perform tasks that are morally repugnant or which employees cannot 
reasonably be expected to do given their skills levels or status.”79  
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Therefore it should be accepted that if the rule departs in material terms from 
the standard of employees in that particular workplace as well as the standard 
of the workplace itself, that rule will fall to be declared unreasonable.  In the 
final analysis, the conduct of an employer to dismiss an employee may be 
found substantively unfair if the rule breached is found to be unlawful and 
unreasonable.  Put differently, an employee will be justified to disregard a rule 
that is unlawful and unreasonable.   
 
(ii) The employee was aware or could reasonably be expected to have 
been aware of the rule or standard; 
 
 
An employee cannot be dismissed for contravention of the rule he was not aware of 
or could not be reasonably said to be aware of.  The principle that ignorance of law 
cannot be an excuse does not apply in this case.80  It is primarily the duty of an 
employer to ensure that employees are aware of what conduct is proscribed in that 
particular workplace.  It is normal practice that the employer will make the 
disciplinary code of conduct available and understood by the employees. 
 
However, as noted above not all rules will and can be contained in the disciplinary 
code of conduct as some will flow from legislation(s) specific to a particular sector, 
previous practice as well as common law.  If an employee disputes that the rule 
contravened was contained in the disciplinary code of conduct and thus argues that 
he/she was not aware of it, the employer may adduce evidence concerning the past 
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practice which the employee was aware of, a legislation or common law.  If it can be 
found that the employee ought to have reasonably known the rule, and indeed that 
the actions in question was in contravention of that rule, the employee may not rely 
on the fact that the rule was not contained in the disciplinary code of conduct.   
 
(iii) The rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer 
 
Consistency in the application of the rule and standard is another important 
determining factor in the notion of substantive fairness.  The jurisprudence as well as 
guidelines recognizes two types of consistency required of an employer in applying 
the rule and sanction viz consistency over time and consistency between the 
employees charged with the same contravention.   
Inconsistency over time occurs when the employer has not, over the past period, 
applied the rule to employees who had committed similar conduct.  An employee 
may argue that the rule has been rendered inconsistence and therefore not 
applicable because it has been disused for a period of time.  In the case of Matshoba 
v Fry’s Metals81, the employees were dismissed for failing to work overtime.  Their 
dismissal was ruled unfair because the employer had never before dismissed 
employees for this reason.   
 
Inconsistency between the employees occurs when the employer treats differently 
employees who have committed same contravention of the rule.   
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However, inconsistency over time will not always absolve an employee if the 
employer can prove that he had since alerted employees of a stricter adherence to 
the application of the rule compared to the past period.  Equally, inconsistency 
between employees may not always absolve the employee as it is also influenced by 
the aggravating and mitigating factors.  For example, employees may be charged 
with same misconduct but with different aggravating and mitigating factors.  For 
example, in the case of SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson (Pty) Ltd82 the Industrial Court 
upheld dismissal of those employees who had been given final warnings for their 
involvement in the earlier unlawful demonstration, but held that the employees who 
had not yet been given warnings should only have been given final warnings for their 
involvement in the ultimate demonstration. 
 
(iv) Dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the 
rule or standard.  
 
 
A decision to dismiss an employee charged with misconduct must be proportionate 
to that misconduct for it to be regarded as fair.  The test is whether the misconduct 
rendered the continued employment intolerable or whether the cumulative effect of 
misconducts made dismissal the only appropriate sanction.  In determining the 
appropriateness of the sanction, a presiding officer is called to exercise value 
judgement.83  In exercising the value judgement, the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal requires that a presiding officer takes into account the following factors: 
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(a) Gravity of the misconduct 
 
 
Ascertaining gravity of misconduct entails two enquiries viz an “inquiry into the 
sanction as a response to the contravention of the rule and an inquiry into the 
circumstances of that contravention”84  If the misconduct is regarded as more 
serious, it is most likely that dismissal will be considered an appropriate response to 
the contravention.  The Code further, without being exhaustive, identifies single acts 
of misconduct that may justify dismissal.  These acts of misconduct include gross 
dishonesty, will damage of property, endangering the safety of other people, assault 
and gross insubordination. 
  
(b) The circumstances of the infringement itself 
 
  
The seriousness of misconduct alone may not always justify dismissal as a sanction.  
The decision on the nature of the sanction to be imposed is also influenced by both 
aggravating and mitigating factors.   Aggravating factors carry with themselves a 
possibility of even imposing a harsher sentence than a prescribed one.  Aggravating 
circumstances and/or factors may include lack of remorse, wilfulness, previous 
disciplinary record, dishonesty and the nature of damaged caused by misconduct.  
 
On the opposite side of aggravating circumstances are mitigating factors.  These are 
factors that may militate against the imposition of a harsher sentence.  However, “an 
employer is not required to take mitigating circumstances into account merely 
because they evoke sympathy.  The test is whether, taken individually or 
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cumulatively, they serve to indicate that the employee will not repeat the office.” 85  
Mitigating factors may include showing remorse, pleading guilty and absence of 
damage or loss to the employer. 
 
(c) The employees circumstances 
 
 
The employer in imposing the sanction is required to take into consideration the 
personal circumstances of the employee.  The weight to be attached to the personal 
circumstances remains an unresolved subject and will also be discussed in detail in 
the chapter four of this study.  In terms of the guidelines, the employees 
circumstances to be considered include length of service, clean disciplinary record 
and employees personal circumstances. It is generally accepted that a clean 
disciplinary record and a long period of service weighs in favour of the employee in 
the continued employment contract.   
 
 
(d) The nature of the employee’s job 
 
 
The nature of business and employees job may be such that misconduct makes the 
continued employment intolerable.  The example is the case of Black Allied Workers 
Union v One Rander Steak House86 where the Industrial Court took into account that 
efficient and quick service was essential in a restaurant functioning on the basis of 
low prices and high turnover.  It held that the employees‟ disobedience as well as 
their slack and inefficient service constituted a fair reason for dismissal.  
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3.5 Jurisprudence from the Sidumo case 
 
The Constitutional Court case of Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd87 became 
a landmark case in resolving the questions on what is entailed in the notion of 
substantive fairness and what should be the role of commissioners in determining 
the fairness of the sanction imposed by the employer.  As evident from chapter two 
of this study, South African courts have, over time, been giving contradictory 
judgments on how the notion of substantive fairness should be established where a 
sanction of dismissal has been imposed.  The net effect of the Sidumo case was the 
jettisoning of the reasonable employer test whose application had been confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA 
and Others.88 
 
In the Sidumo Case, a security officer who was responsible for access control at one 
of the mines of the employer was required to search persons exiting the premises.  
He was captured on surveillance camera which showed that the he had conducted 
only one search, that he did not perform searches at all on at least eight occasions 
and on fifteen occasions he did not perform the search according to the established 
procedures and that he allowed persons to sign the search register when no search 
had been conducted.  The presiding officer at the disciplinary hearing found him 
guilty of carrying out his duties negligently and of failing to follow company 
procedures.   
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The matter was referred to the CCMA which held that his dismissal was unfair taking 
into account that his violations were a mistake and/or unintentional; that no actual 
losses could be proved by the employer; and that he had 15 years of service with a 
clean record.  The CCMA Commissioner, although rejecting the excuses by Sidumo, 
found that the misconduct did not go “into the heart of the relationship with the 
employer”, hence the continued work could not be said to be intolerable.  Both the 
Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court, although critical with some reasoning of 
the commissioner, found that the sanction of dismissal was too harsh and therefore 
unfair.  In finding that dismissal was unfair, the courts took into account the long 
service of Sidumo and the fact that he had no previous confrontations with the rules.  
 
The employer took the matter to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which overturned the 
decision of the CCMA Commissioner as confirmed by the Labour Court and the 
Labour Appeal Court.  Re-affirming the „defer to employer‟ approach Cameron JA 
said: 
“…a CCMA commissioner is not vested with discretion to impose a sanction in the 
case of workplace incapacity or misconduct.  That discretion belongs in the first 
instance to the employer.  The commissioners enjoys no discretion in relation to 
sanction, but bears the duty of determining whether the employer‟s sanction is fair”89 
  
Referring with approval the dictum of the Labour Appeal Court in Nampak 
Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza90 as well as that of Count Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA and Others91, Cameron JA proceeded to say: 
“It is in my view regrettable that the LAC has not consistently affirmed and applied 
the analysis.  Although some panels have affirmed Ngcobo AJP‟s approach, this 
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case indicates how far the practice of the LAC has on occasion strayed from it.  
Instead of exhorting commissioners to exercise greater caution when intervening and 
to show a measure of deference to the employer‟s sanction so long as it fair, it has 
insulated commissioners‟ decisions from intervention by importing unduly constrictive 
criteria into the review process.”92 
 
Sidumo and others took the matter to the Constitutional Court, which effectively 
rejected the reasonable employer test and replaced it with “a reasonable decision-
maker” test.    The “reasonable decision-maker” test is premised on the exercise of 
value judgment by a presiding officer.  This means that it is the sense of fairness by 
the commissioner which must prevail and this should be done without deferring to 
the employer.  A court will only interfere with the decision of the commissioner to the 
extent that no reasonable decision maker could have arrived at that decision. The 
Court also found that there is no constitutional obligation that that a commissioner, in 
determining fairness, should defer to the perspective of the employer93.  The 
commissioner is expected to act as an impartial adjudicator. 
 
The Constitutional Court cited with approval the case of National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-opertive Ltd and Others94 where the Appellate 
Division stated that: 
 
“Fairness comprehends that regard must be had not only to the position and interests 
of the worker, but also those of the employer, in order to make a balanced and 
equitable assessment.  In judging fairness, a court applies a moral or value judgment 
to established facts and circumstances.  And in doing so it must have due and proper 
regard to the objectives sought to be achieved by the Act.”95 
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The Constitutional Court further established that fairness requires a balance of 
interests between the employee and employer.  To strike that balance, Navsa J 
enumerated factors, not exhaustive, that must be taken into account:   
“In approaching the dismissal dispute impartially a commissioner will take into 
account the totality of circumstances.  He or she will necessarily take into account the 
importance of the rule that had been breached. The commissioner must of course 
consider the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal, as he or she 
must take into account the basis of the employee‟s challenge to the dismissal…the 
harm caused by the employee‟s conduct, whether additional training and instruction 
may result in the employee not repeating the misconduct, the effect of dismissal on 
the employee and his or her long-service record”96 
 
In arriving at its decision, having applied the new test of a reasonable commissioner, 
the Constitutional Court held that the decision reached by the commissioner in this 
case was not one which a reasonable decision maker could not reach.  The court 
had due regard to the fact that there was no dishonesty; that the mine suffered no 
losses; the employee had a history of long-serving duty and a clean disciplinary 
record.97  It further found that the commissioner sufficiently applied his mind and 
considered all the elements of the Code of Good Practice.   
 
The Constitutional Court judgment sought to put to rest the confusion which has 
been proceeding for years on application of the nation of substantive fairness.  It is 
quite intriguing that the Supreme Court of Appeal opted to override the earlier 
decision of the Appellate Division in the case of National Union of Metalworkers of 
SA v Vetsak Co-Operative Ltd had conclusively decided and held that when 
determining whether dismissal constituted an unfair labour practice, the court must 
apply its own moral and value judgment.  
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The codification and interpretation of what is entailed in the notion of substantive 
fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct has marked a progressive step forward 
in the regulation of employment relations.  These developments have, to a larger 
extent, assisted in eliminating contradictions witnessed in the judgments before the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Labour Relations Act and the 



























The preceding chapters (two and three) have provided a detailed outline of the 
development of jurisprudence relating to the notion of substantive fairness in cases 
of dismissal for misconduct.  Following years of conflicting court judgements on what 
is entailed in establishing substantive fairness, the Constitutional Court in the 
Sidumo case sought resolve the conflict by determining that arbitrators must 
exercise value judgement in determining substantive fairness.  The direct implication 
of this Constitutional Court judgment was the effective rejection of the „employer 
deference‟ approach as borrowed from the English statute.  The „employer 
deference‟ approach required arbitrators to defer to the reasoning and interest of the 
employer. 
 
In the Sidumo case, the Constitutional Court found that the „employer deference‟ 
approach has no place in the South African law and arbitrators are, in exercising 
value judgment, expected to strike a balance between the interests of the employer 
and the employee. In balancing the interests of the parties the court, without being 
exhaustive, enumerated some factors that need be taken into account by arbitrators 
which include the importance of the rule that had been breached; the reason that the 
employer imposed the sanction of dismissal; the basis of the employee‟s challenge 
to the dismissal; the harm caused by the employee‟s conduct; whether additional 
training and instruction would result in the employee not repeating the misconduct; 
the effect of dismissal on the employee; and his or her long service .  These factors 
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complement the guidelines contained in the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal which 
appears in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, as amended, which were discussed 
in detail in chapter 3 of this study. 
This chapter will deal with the gaps in the application of value judgment in 
determining substantive fairness and further propose the constitutional value of 
dignity to anchor the application of the value judgment.  
 
 
Challenges with the application of value judgement 
 
The first grey areas on the exercise of the value judgment were highlighted in the 
very same case of Sidumo.  Passing a separate concurring judgment in the Sidumo 
case, Ngcobo J observed as follows: 
“…however objective the determination of the fairness of a dismissal might be, it is a 
determination based upon a value judgment.  Indeed the exercise of a value 
judgment is something about which reasonable people may readily differ.   
But it could not have been the intention of the law-maker to leave the determination 
of fairness to the unconstrained value judgment of the commissioner.  Were that 
have to be the case the outcome of a dispute could be determined by the 
background and perspective of the commissioner.  The result may well be that a 
commissioner with an employer background could give a decision that is biased in 
favour of the employer, while a commissioner with a worker background would give a 
decision that is biased in favour of a worker.”98  
 
In the attempt to constrain the application of the value judgement, Schedule 8 f the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 enumerates guidelines to be considered by any 
person who is determining whether or not dismissal for misconduct is fair.  These 
guidelines have been discussed in detail in chapter two of this study.  These 
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guidelines are purported be the basis within which balancing the scale of interests 
between those of the employer and those of the employee can be achieved.   
 
Whilst the Constitutional Court in the Sidumo case was unanimous in rejecting the 
“defer to employer” approach in favour of value judgment, it appears that the weight 
to be accorded to the interests of the employer is still greater than that to be 
accorded to the interests of the employees.   This is evident from Ngcobo J who 
observed that: 
“what is required of a commissioner is to take seriously the reasons for the employer 
establishing the rule and prescribing a penalty of dismissal for breach of it…the 
commissioner should respect the fact that the employer is likely to have greater 
knowledge of the demands of the business than the commissioner.” 99 
 
The above passage reveals the fact that the „defer to the employer‟ approach still 
has a considerable level of influence within the expected exercise of value judgment 
by the commissioners.  
 
The Sidumo case and all other judgements that followed have not sought to 
establish what value(s) as opposed to facts are relevant in exercising the value 
judgement.  The requirement to balance the interests of the employer and employee 
remains a question of attaching weight to established facts as opposed to attaching 
weight to any value.  The major deficiency of the exercise of balancing the interests 
of parties in establishing substantive fairness is explained succinctly by Andre Van 
Niekerk when he argues that:  
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“Implicit to this [balancing approach] is the assumption that both the employer 
and employee are the beneficiaries of the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices, and that the enquiry commences with the scales evenly 
balanced…what weight is to be attached to each of the competing interests 
and if there is to be a ranking, how is the ranking of interests to be 
determined.”100 
 
Christine Venter further makes a point that: 
“The problem with this method [balancing approach] is not only that we have long 
since forgotten that the idea that judges can „weigh‟ interests is metaphorical, but that 
the metaphor is not even exact in that the idea of „balancing‟ would seem to connote 
evenness and equity, while in reality judges decided that one interest carries more 
„weight‟ than the other, and thus find in favour of that party.  The interests are not 
evenly balanced, or judges would never reach a decision, but the metaphor 
erroneously suggests at least equilibrium if not equality”101 
 
As argued in chapter one of this study, employers wield more power compared to the 
employees because of the fact that employers not only do they own the means of 
production, but they enact and determine the rules of the game.  When an employee 
is hired, he/she enters into an already made up system where he/she has little 
influence, if any, on what becomes the code of conduct at the work place.  Given 
these realities, it is unavoidable that the balance of interest of the parties will always 
start in favour of the employer.  Consequently, the employee is required to prove the 
weight of his/her interest from a disadvantaged standpoint.   This situation also 
places onus on the employee to prove his/her worth. 
 
The force of the Schedule 8 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal remains that of 
guidelines and not law.  In the case of Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners and 
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Another102 Landman J dealt with the force of codes of practice and quoted the 
following remarks from an English text, I T Smith and J C Woo Industrial Law, 4th ed. 
(B) at 266: 
“Compliance with the codes‟ provisions on matters of discipline and dismissal will 
therefore be most material to an employer‟s claim that he acted reasonably and fairly 
although, as the code does not have the force of law, failure to comply with it will not 
make the action in question automatically unfair for there may be good reasons for 
not complying with the facts of a particular case” 
 
In addition, Landman J made the following observation: 
 
“I am of the opinion that the observations by Wood and Smith apply to the code of 
good practice set out in schedule 8 of the Act.  These guidelines do not give rise to 
rights, they are incapable of supporting an independent action, at least not in this 
court.  Only when their exercise or non-exercise leads to an unfair dismissal are they 
recognized and can the results of a failure to abide by them be remedied”103  
 
The force of the code of good practice as demonstrated in the above passages 
suggests that circumstances of each case may determine their applicability or how 
they weigh up.  Consequently, as will be seen in the cases below, the code of good 
practice has not always favoured the employees even at the slightest act 
misconduct. The code of good practice supposes to give parameters to the exercise 
of value judgment; however it appears that in practices, as will be shown below, the 
exercise of the value judgment, itself, determines what force is to be attached to the 
guidelines. 
 
The Sidumo case has been followed by some cases where it is apparent that the 
interests of the employers weigh more than those of the employees.  Whilst the 
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judges have followed the test as laid down in the Sidumo case, the softness of 
breach leading to dismissals indicates that the balancing approach does not always 
result in a balanced judgment and that force of the code of good practice is fluid. 
One of the immediate cases after the Sidumo case was the case of Theewaterskloof 
Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining Council (Western Cape 
Division and Others)104   
 
The Theewasterkloof Municipality case involved the respondent whom the 
municipality erroneously paid an amount of R7 000 over two months as part of the 
Essential Transport Scheme.  When the respondent was approached to repay the 
amount unduly paid to him, he offered to pay it in the instalment of R10 per month 
which would have taken 50 years to liquidate the debt.   
The Labour Court upheld the decision to expel him on the basis that the relationship 
between the Municipality and the respondent had broken down irretrievable.  In 
reaching its decision, the court considered that the respondent was holding a senior 
position in the municipality and was aware that he had unduly received the money 
and that he showed no remorse as he insisted for two months on his arrangement of 
repaying the money at the instalment of R10 per month.  
Whilst the court considered the fact that the respondent had long period of service 
and a clean record over his service, it continued that:  
 “although a value judgement must eventually be based on a holistic appraisal of all 
factors, this is a case in which a primary comparison can helpfully be drawn between 
the length of service and clean record, on one hand, and the circumstances of the 
offence and lack of remorse amounting to defiance, on the other…when this is done, 
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it becomes clear that the capacity of the municipality to continue its employment of 
Mr Henn is eroded as his defiance is prolonged from one week to the next”105   
 
This case is a proof that that the very factors that seek to circumscribe the exercise 
of value judgment cannot always be uniformly applied, hence fail to provide the 
normative justice required to balance the interest of the parties involved.  The spirit 
of the Sidumo case, the Code of Good Practice and the factors listed are supposed 
to be considered from the standpoint of favouring the employee when the scales are 
to be balanced.  However, what becomes apparent from the case in casu is that, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, it is possible not to consider the factors 
collectively, but select the few and put them on different ends of the scale in order to 
determine fairness.   
 
The conundrum posed by the absence of what weight and/or value is to be attached 
to each competing interest between those of the employer and employee resulted to 
the decision in the case of Miyambo v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration106   which palpably is not in line with the spirit and purport of the 
judgement in the Sidumo case.  In this case, the employee was dismissed for the 
theft of a few pieces of scrap metal from the skip.  The commissioner had found that 
the penalty of dismissal was unduly harsh, which is the finding that was overturned 
by the Labour Court whose decision was further confirmed by the Labour Appeal 
Court.  The Labour Appeal Court reasoned that business risk is predominantly based 
on the trustworthiness of employees and that an accumulation of individual breaches 
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of trust has significant economic repercussions – therefore the dismissal was 
justified for operational reasons and was fair.107  
 
Palpable form the decision of the Miyambo case is the greater weight placed on the 
lack of trustworthiness of the employee.  The employee is expected to respect lawful 
orders and serve the employer with honesty, diligence and faithfulness.  On the 
contrary, this is not the same standard expected from the employer.   
 
The Miyambo case also heavily relied on the “zero tolerance” policy on theft as 
contained in the companies code of conduct.  However, in the case of Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Tokiso and Others108  Landman JA observed as follows: 
“…the law does not allow an employer to adopt a zero tolerance approach for all 
infractions, regardless of its appropriateness or proportionality to the offence…the 
touchstone of the law of dismissal is fairness and an employer cannot contract out of 
it or fashion, as if it were a no go area for commissioners.  A zero tolerance policy 
would be appropriate where, for example, the stock is gold but it would not 
necessarily be appropriate where an employee of the same employer removes a 
crust of bread.”109  
 
Miyambo was dismissed for theft of few pieces of scrap metal from the skip with the 
aim of fixing his stove.  Although the scrap metal was not going to be thrown away 
but would be sold by the company, this single act of misconduct could not even be 
counter-balanced with a long clean record of service by the employee, the impact of 
dismissal to Mr Miyambo and other surrounding personal circumstances.  
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APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF DIGINTY – AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
In the section above, shortcomings of the exercise of value judgment in determining 
substantive fairness in cases of dismissal for misconduct have been discussed in 
detail.  In the final analysis the exercise of value judgment, as it stands, fails to 
provide a coherent conception of justice based on value(s) to be protected in the 
cases of dismissal for misconduct.  This section proposes the application of the 
constitutional value of dignity to underpin the exercise of value judgment in order to 
avoid inconsistencies and to properly protect workers from unscrupulous employers. 
 
The exercise value judgement should be anchored on a value to be protected.  In 
this proposed approach, the value to be protected is that of dignity of human beings.  
In South Africa, with a constitutional democracy method of governance, dignity is a 
stand-alone right contained in the Constitution as well as a value used to interpret 
other rights.  This has been best illustrated in the cases of Dawood and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs110 and Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others.111    
 
Dignity is not only a right provided for in the Bill of Rights, but is amongst the anchors 
of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  In terms of section 10 of the 
Constitution “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.”  The right to dignity, together with the right to life, is a non-
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derogable right in its entirety as provided by the s 37 table of non-derogable rights in 
Constitution.     
 
It terms of the founding provisions of the Constitution, the Republic of South African 
is a democratic state founded, amongst others, on the values of human dignity.  The 
importance of the right to dignity in the Constitution is further elaborated in section 
36, the limitation clause.  In terms of s36, rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited to 
the extent that such limitation is, amongst others, justifiable based on human dignity.  
Section 39 of the Constitution further provides that a body, when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, must promote, inter alia, values based on human dignity.   
 
The foregoing spells out in no uncertain terms the value that the Constitution, which 
is the supreme law of the land, places on human dignity.  The Constitutional Court, 
the highest court in the land, has also placed prime value to the right to dignity.  In 
the case of S v Makwanyane 112, Justice O‟Regan found that: 
“recognizing the right to dignity is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic work of human 
beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.  
This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights”113 
 
The late former Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson, underscored the significance of 
the right to dignity when he was delivering the Third Bram Fischer Lecture in May 
2000 where he said: 
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“The affirmation of human dignity as one of the founding values of the Constitution is 
significant.  The interim Constitution emphasised the values of democracy, freedom 
and equality.  Although dignity is immanent in these values and in the rights 
entrenched in the interim Constitution‟s Bill of Rights, its role as a foundational value 
of the constitutional order was not acknowledged in specific terms until the adoption 
of the 1996 Constitution.  Consistently with this, the 1996 Constitution now refers to 
the „inherent dignity‟ of all people, thus asserting that respect for human dignity, and 
all that flows from it, as an attribute of life itself, and not a privilege granted by the 
state.”114 
 
In the case of Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others115  
O‟Regan J explained the value of human dignity as follows: 
“The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot be doubted.  The 
Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for Black 
South Africans was routinely and cruelly denied.  It asserts it too to inform the future, 
to invest in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings.  Human 
dignity therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of 
levels…human dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central significance in 
the limitation analysis.”116   
 
Therefore, if the constitutional value of dignity is important in adjudication and 
interpretation as well as has a central significance in the limitation analysis, it stands 
to reason that the exercise of value judgment should also be guided and anchored 
on the constitutional value of dignity.   
 
The previous injustices meted against Black people in general and Africans in 
particular made them to be viewed them as sub-humans where their value did not 
matter at all.  To the owners of means of production, the employers, Black people 
were only useful to the extent that they were able to provide cheap labour for 
                                                          
114
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02587203.2000.11827594?needAccess=true&journalCode=r
jhr20 (accessed on the 17 September 2017) 
115
 (2000) ZACC 8 
116
 Supra, para 35 
59 | P a g e  
 
employers to maximise their profits margins.  These past injustices are recognized in 
the preamble of the Constitution. Restoring dignity of the historically downtrodden 
people requires that the protection at work place is as such that those who survive 
by selling their labour should not be treated as objects for profit maximisation.  
Dignity of a human being is inseparable with a sustainable livelihood, which is only 
possible through work security.   
 
Work security is an integral part of dignity for any human being.  It provides a person 
with food, shelter, clothing and whatever else desirable and necessary for a person‟s 
maintenance and improvement of conditions of life.  When a person is unable to 
generate means to sustain life, his or her dignity gets impaired.   
 
When an individual is unscrupulously denied of work security, such an individual will 
not have means for decent shelter, food, medical assistance and indeed the future of 
his or her descendants will be denied.  All this will invariably lead to impairment of 
human dignity as enshrined in the Constitution.  In the case of Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others117 the court found that 
“the foundational values of the Constitution, those of human dignity, freedom and 
equality are denied to those who have no food, clothing or shelter.”118 
 
Inherent to the notion of substantive fairness is the need for the protection of 
employees from being unfairly denied work.  Work is an anchor for protection of the 
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constitutional value of and right to dignity.  Flowing from this assertion, it stands to 
reason that the exercise of value judgment, for it to provide coherent normative 
justice, should be underpinned by the constitutional value of dignity. 
 
The constitutional value of dignity will require the presiding officers to consider what 
real impact does dismissal have on the employee as opposed to only consider the 
impact on the side of the employer and operational needs.   
 
In the case of Miyambo, the employee was dismissed merely for theft of a scrap 
metal which he took to fix his stove. If the court considered what impact dismissal for 
theft of a scrap metal will have on dignity of Mr Miyambo and his family, it would 
have been compelled to find that the sanction was disproportionate  to the extent 
that if amounted to substantive unfairness.  The dismissal of Mr Miyambo 
undermined his constitutionally protected right to dignity.   
 
The application of the constitutional value of dignity does not in any way mean that 
employees will commit acts of misconduct with impunity.  The right to dignity is also 
subject to the limitation clause like all other rights.   
Section 36 (1) provides that: 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extents that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality an freedom, taking into 
account all factors including –  
a) The nature of the right 
b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation 
c) The nature and extend of the limitation 
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d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
 
The implication of the application of the value/right to dignity in the exercise of value 
judgment is that dismissal as a sanction should pass the standard set by the s36 of 
the Constitution – the limitation clause.  The employer would be required to prove the 
importance and the purpose of dismissal (as limitation); the relationship between 
dismissal and purpose it seeks to achieve; and whether there are no other less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
The application of the value of dignity does not propose that the guidelines on the 
Code of Good Practice should be discarded.  It aims to tighten the protection of 
workers from being treated as commodities to be dispensed with at the whims of the 
employer.  It recognized the fact that in the employment contract, both parties need 




South African labour law has undoubtedly undergone progressive stages of 
development in so far as the protection of workers in concerned.  It has developed 
from common law where rights and recourse of workers were governed by common 
law of contract and where the notion of substantive fairness was virtually non-
existence.  With the influence of political and socio-economic developments in South 
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Africa as well as International Labour Standards, the notion of substantive was 
introduced in the labour jurisprudence of South Africa. 
 
Notwithstanding these positive and progressive developments of law, the notion of 
substantive fairness remained elusive until the Constitutional Court judgement in 
Sidumo case.  Prior the Sidumo case, the South African court borrowed from the 
English Statute in dealing with the notion of substantive fairness.  The net effect of 
the English Statute influence was the South African courts deferring to the interests 
of the employers and decided cases on what is in the advantage of employers. 
 
Following a marathon of contradictory legal battles, the Constitutional Court in the 
Sidumo case sought to resolve the matter by finding that the notion of substantive 
fairness entails exercise of value judgment by presiding officers and that they are not 
required to defer to the interest of employers.  The presiding officers are required to 
strike the balance between the interests of employers and those of employee and 
are guided by the guidelines contained in the Code of Good Practice.   
 
Notwithstanding the Constitutional Court judgment, the exercise of value judgment 
does not provide and/or establish the value to inform any judgment in determining 
substantive fairness.  As argue above, the guidelines contained in the Code of Good 
Practice have no force of law and subsequent cases from the Sidumo case have 
proven that, without an identified value as opposed to facts, employees continue to 
be at a disadvantaged position. 
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To curb the chasm in the exercise of value judgment, this study has proposed that 
the constitutional value of dignity to inform the exercise of value judgment.  
Consequently, in establishing substantive fairness in case of dismissal the presiding 
officers should consider how dismissal will impugn the dignity of the employee.  Like 
all other rights, the value and right to dignity is subject to the limitation clause.  
Therefore, the consideration of the value of dignity in exercising value judgment will 
not mean employees can then commit acts of misconduct with impunity.   
 
If the constitutional value of dignity is important in adjudication and interpretation as 
well as has a central significance in the limitation analysis, as was found in the case 
of Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others119 it stands to reason 
that the exercise of value judgment should also be guided and anchored on the 
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